Recently, Xi Jinping has frequently visited different military units for inspections, especially the inspection of the airborne troops in Xiaogan, Hubei on November 4, which attracted widespread attention. In less than a month, Xi Jinping inspected the Rocket Force and the Airborne Forces in succession. This move appears to show his emphasis on military power, but upon closer inspection, it seems unusual, especially in his speech, he avoided words such as "the party's absolute leadership over the army" and "loyalty", which seems to have hidden meanings.

Background of intensive inspections and changes in military management

On October 17, Xi Jinping visited a unit of the Rocket Force in Anhui, and in his inspection in Hubei on November 4, he turned his attention to the airborne troops. This choice is different from the usual pattern of inspecting troops. In all previous inspections, Xi Jinping would emphasize "the party's absolute leadership over the army", but this time he rarely avoided talking about military power. In this speech, He Weidong also appeared to accompany the inspection, but Xi Jinping did not particularly emphasize "political construction of the army" in his speech, which is different from his usual statements.

What is more noteworthy is that Xi Jinping once emphasized "obeying the command of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission", but gradually blurred the command subject of military power. As the general secretary and chairman of the Military Commission, Xi Jinping should be the absolute helmsman, but this time he only mentioned "the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission", which made the outside world wonder whether the military power is no longer concentrated in Xi Jinping's hands alone, but decentralized by multiple power agencies.

The subtle change of the party's command over the army

In recent years, Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized "political construction of the army" and the loyalty of the army, but in recent inspections, this political expression has been weakened and replaced by the actual improvement of "preparing for war". In the report on November 4, Xinhua News Agency used "comprehensively strengthen training and preparation for war" as the title, and no longer emphasized "political training" or "political construction of the army". Why did Xi Jinping, who has always prioritized highlighting political loyalty, pay so much attention to military training and combat capabilities at this time?

The arrangement of this inspection of the airborne troops also sparked discussion from the outside world. Although the airborne troops belong to the Air Force, they still lack the support of large transport aircraft in actual combat, making it difficult to form real combat effectiveness. The outside world questioned whether his inspection was more of a symbolic gesture than a real combat preparation.

Decentralization of military power: The role of the Central Military Commission is becoming increasingly prominent

Xi Jinping mentioned "the command of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission" in his speech on October 17, without directly highlighting his personal command power. The current Central Military Commission has a total of 6 members, namely Xi Jinping, Vice Chairmen Zhang Youxia and He Weidong, and members Liu Zhenli, Miao Hua, and Zhang Shengmin. With the strengthening of the collective command of the Military Commission, the power operation mode of the military seems to be shifting towards collective decision-making, which also makes Xi Jinping's command power appear relatively decentralized.

In the past, Xi Jinping's absolute control over the military was described as the "Chairman of the Military Commission is responsible for the system", but this structure has been weakened in recent speeches. Many military observers believe that this may imply that military power is no longer monopolized by a single leader, but is collectively led by the Central Military Commission. This also means that even Xi Jinping cannot issue orders that affect the operation of the army alone.

Selection of inspection targets and considerations behind them

This time, Xi Jinping inspected the airborne troops, but did not make further deployments for other more combat-oriented troops such as the Marine Corps, Navy and Army. Although the Taiwan issue has attracted much attention in geopolitics, the combat capability of the airborne troops is limited, making this inspection somewhat superficial. The outside world believes that this may be an action with more symbolic significance rather than real military preparations.

In addition, Hubei belongs to the Central Theater Command, but the commander and political commissar of the Central Theater Command have never appeared, further exacerbating the uncertainty of the high-level command system of the military. With the advancement of military reform and the improvement of the theater level, the actual role of the theater commander has gradually increased. However, the recent inspection arrangements reflect the increase in the priority of the troops directly under the Central Military Commission, and the dominance of the regional theater seems to have weakened.

Intensification of internal difficulties and external speculation

Recently, there have been frequent changes in the top ranks of the military, and signs of the decentralization of military power have become increasingly obvious. This has not only caused doubts about the internal stability of the Communist Party of China, but also questioned Xi Jinping's control. As the US election approaches, China's internal affairs seem to be getting more chaotic, the internal instability of Zhongnanhai is difficult to conceal, and the outside world's speculation about the future is becoming more complicated.

Xi Jinping's continuous inspections in a short period of time are meant to declare military power, but his rare avoidance of core issues reflects his delicate mentality towards military management.